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Over  the  past  three  decades,  Web  has  evolved  from  an 
information medium to an intricate economic ecosystem. Initially 
focused  on  supporting  the  transition  from  traditional  business 
practices to e-commerce, the Web has given rise to new, purely 
Web  based  businesses.  Aligned  with  the  original  vision  and 
expectations of the ‘free Web’, they have provided free services 
but, over time, developed business models that leverage the user 
digital  footprints  and  the  user  generated  content  to  create 
economic  value.  With  the  use  of  computing  technologies  to 
analyze, aggregate, and share such data, individuals’ privacy has 
been undermined and, with that, the their ability to shape their 
role in the digital society and beyond. The purpose of this paper is 
to  instigate the  dialogue  around  the  critical  societal  issues that 
arise  from  the  current  Web  economy  and  motivate  research 
initiatives to assist with addressing them. We present three case 
studies that quantify the extent, rate, and pervasiveness of the user 
tracking on the Web. We use them to illustrate the determining 
aspects of the Web that have to be taken into account by the Web 
Science community.  As researchers we aspire to understand the 
nature of the Web in depth and, based on that, propose designs 
and policies that are required to ensure that the Web is fit to be the 
underpinning of our societies and our digital future.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.3.5  [Online  Information  Services]:  Commercial  services; 
Web-based  services;  Sharing;  K.4.1  [Public  Policy  Issues]:  
Privacy.   
General Terms 
Economics; Human Factors, Legal Aspects. 
Keywords 
Privacy; security; surveillance; dataveillance; policy; economics; 
regulation. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent news about the degree of the National Security Agency 
(NSA) surveillance of the Web has caused international concern 
and challenge to the degree of governmental observation of our 
lives. The Web founder, Tim Berners-Lee has called for “better 
protection of internet users privacy” in a variety of fora
1, calling 
                                                                  
1 Tim Berners-Lee: UK and US must do more to protect internet 
users'  privacy.  Friday  22  November  2013  08.40  GMT 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/22/tim-
berners-lee-internet-privacy-surveillance-censorship 
“spying” a “betrayal” of the Web
2. We share the sentiment and 
fully  support  any  effort  to  curtail  such  practices.  We,  as  Web 
Science  experts  and  affected  citizens,  however,  want  a  deeper 
dialogue around the issue. This paper offers evidence towards this 
discussion. For example, if we consider the assertion of betrayal 
of “the Web”, we must explore what is meant by “the Web” for 
which spying is a betrayal and, further, if “mass surveillance” is 
the hallmark betrayal of that entity, hasn’t it already happened? 
We will show that the Web has evolved from its early days as a 
document web into its current state as a surveillance web, and that 
in the context of its growth and evolution, this outcome is both 
inevitable  and  unlikely  to  change  without  either  radical 
intervention  or  paradigm  shifting  invention,  neither  of  which 
seems currently likely.  
Indeed,  under  the  leadership  of  Berners-Lee,  the  World  Wide 
Web  Consortium  has  sponsored  the  “Do  Not  Track”  (DNT) 
initiative.
3  DNT was seen as a voluntary standard proposed to 
ward  off  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC)  intervention 
around the Web privacy legislation, and from which at least one 
large advertisers’ group withdrew, putting the initiative in doubt.
4 
More importantly, this withdrawal suggests that advertisers feel 
they  need  not  be  concerned  about  legislation  curtailing  their 
tracking activities.  Why not? What is the significant difference 
between the surveillance and “threats to privacy” of the NSA vs. 
the user tracking embodied by Web businesses, the resellers and 
ad  auctioneers  like  Doubleclick  or  Facebook  as  business  as 
normal? Is it possible for the NSA to “betray” the Web, if the 
Web  itself  is  already  the  Surveillance  Web?  To  address  these 
queries  we  look  to  Web  prehistory  that  identifies  the  path  to 
surveillance that any networked data system will develop given  
particular conditions - like the ones we now have for the Web. 
In the pre-Internet, pre-Web era of 1988, the Communications of 
the  ACM  published  an  article  by  Roger  Clarke,  titled 
“Dataveillence”, that is eerily prescient [3]. “IT technologies”, he 
warns, “already make information sharing between governments 
and private companies easy”.  Indeed, computing systems have 
essentially replaced the sophisticated and expensive physical and 
electronic surveillance by enabling highly automated, cheaper and 
systematic collection of data about people. People's behaviour is 
                                                                  
2 Tim Berners-Lee: NSA spying is 'betrayal' of world wide web. 
The  Week  http://www.theweek.co.uk/uk -news/nsa/55961/tim-
berners-lee-nsa-spying-betrayal-world-wide-web 
3  Tracking  Preferences  Extension.  Jan  28,  2014 
http://www.w3.org/TR/2014/WD-tracking-dnt-20140128/ 
4 Do-Not-Track Show Will Go On at W3C Advertising Age. Sept 
20,  2013  --  For  Now.  http://adage.com/article/privacy -and-
regulation/track-show-w3c/244285/ monitored through the increasingly intensive data trails that their 
behaviour is generating. 
Clarke  also  references  US  work  from  the  60’s  that  chose  to 
abandon  a  national  data  center  scheme  in  the  interests  of 
protecting  privacy.  He  laments  that  three  conditions  only  are 
required for any system to become a surveillance system: (1) a 
range of services processing personal data, (2) with these services 
connected on a shared telecommunications network, and (3) with 
the  data  consistently  identifiable,  that  national  data  center,  and 
hence the dissolution of privacy, effectively exists.  He warns that 
two features must have already been in place for privacy to have 
been  protected:  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  controls.  He  argues  that 
intrinsic  controls  such  as  a  consumer  watch  dog  or  even 
competitor  are  not  possible  when  “surveillance  activities  are 
undertaken  in  a  covert  manner.”  Extrinsic  controls  are  laws, 
economic  policies  and  “natural”  rejection  by  the  society  of 
unpalatable practices – all of which require again these practices 
to be visible..  
If  we  apply  Clarke’s  metrics  to  current  history,  we  see  such 
unpalatability of the now very visible NSA surveillance, but not 
around the more pervasive daily surveillance  we do not see or 
somehow take as given, even if we might not be able to explain its 
mechanisms. In this paper, we quantify at least some of them. In 
the current Web era, we are tracked at every click in a “covert 
manner” that Berners-Lee and most of us abhor about the NSA 
breaches.  Likewise,  we  can  be  re-identified  from  our  traces 
through the Web with as little as three pieces of information [23]. 
Multiple  groups  collect  and  trade  in  this  information.  Clarke’s 
“Extrinsic controls” are likewise impossible now as predicted, in 
the absence of “comprehensive information privacy laws” being 
in  place.  Legislation  like  EU’s  “cookie  laws”,  requiring  that 
companies to declare that they use cookies [29], is hardly useful 
when few of us know what a cookie is, or what that cookie may 
be capable of enabling. There are no laws that other tracking that 
does not leave traces – we describe below – is also being used.  
Our research has looked at the prevalence of the user surveillance 
on the Web that fuels Web businesses. We have found it to be 
almost  ubiquitous  and  dominated  by  a  small  number  of  Web 
entities [4]. In less than 30 clicks we get unknowingly ensnared in 
the widespread surveillance nets of all top 10 trackers. Each net is 
woven  of  a  large  number  of  Web  sites  that  have  given  them 
permission  to  track  the  visitors  in  exchange  for  market 
intelligence  and  targeted  ad  campaigns.  We  are  left  without 
policies and legislations to give us a voice in the matter. There are 
no even sensible measures to enforce transparency around such 
activities, leaving us without means to develop strategies to deal 
with  them.  It  is  through  this  void,  the  lack  of  intrinsic  and 
extrinsic controls that Clarke’s has warned us about, that the Web 
has transformed itself into a surveillance Web.  From this stems 
the  deep  irony:  the  “betrayal  of  the  Web”  ascribed  to  NSA 
escapes any meaningful argument; the Web that could be betrayed 
in that manner no longer exists.  
This  observation  begs  another  important  question  to  which  we 
alluded  above:  has  this  transformation  of  the  Web  been  a 
“natural”  inevitable  evolution  of  a  data-oriented  technology? 
Given  Clarke’s  description  of  dataveillence,  we  can  see  it  as 
inevitable, whether by nature or nurture.  Thus, we are faced with 
a dilemma: to go forward with the dataveillence status quo, or try 
to get the Berners-Lee’s Web back. If the latter, do we stand a 
chance  to  succeed  with  the  currently  enshrouded  Web 
infrastructure? Or must we start again; this time with intrinsic and 
extrinsic controls established from the start?  
We raise these questions with a full understanding that they are 
beyond  a  single  research  paper  and  already  contemplated  to 
various degrees by researchers in Web privacy, personal identity 
and  Web  commerce.  Our  goals  for  this  paper  are:  (1)  to  offer 
quantified evidence of the Surveillance Web, and (2) to situate the 
discussion of the Surveillance Web in terms of the Web Science 
agenda. 
Towards  the  first  goal,  we  present  three  case  studies  that  we 
conducted to quantify tracking that the users are exposed to while 
engaging  in  three  basic  Web  activities:  browsing,  search,  and 
sharing Web content within social media. As Clarke suggests, if 
we see it, we can explore intrinsic control. Second, based on the 
study  results,  we  offer  suggestions  where  in  Web  Science  this 
evidence might be carried forward to support explorations of three 
important  Web  aspects  around  extrinsic  controls:  Web 
engineering, regulations, and economics. 
In the rest of this paper, we first motivate our focus on the Web as 
the economic ecosystem driven by the data-exchange business and 
then, in the background and the related work section discuss the 
types of data traces that are involved in obscure tracing of the 
Web users. In Case Studies we present three typical use scenarios 
on the Web and the level of surveillance that the users are exposed 
to. Finally, we situate these observations in terms of a proposed 
Web Science discussion about the surveillance Web as the reality 
that  we  need  to  take  into  account  when  conducting  research, 
devising methods to investigate individuals attitudes and societal 
preferences, and consider issues of design, engineering and policy 
to support or change the status quo.   
2.  MOTIVATION 
The  Web  has  been  conceived  as  an  information  medium  that 
enables transfer of data and information among organizations and 
individuals. It has since evolved into an intricate and multifaceted 
environment  that  enables  ubiquitous  access  to  digital  content, 
communication  and  social  interactions  by  the  consumers  and 
organizations.    From  the  engineering  point  of  view,  the  Web 
comprises a distributed computing infrastructure that uses HTTP 
protocols  as  the  basis  for  network  communication  and  an 
information  architecture  that  uses  hypertext  as  a  unifying 
mechanism for content organization and access. The latter is the 
dominant aspect of the user experience on the Web as the user 
accesses  the  content  through  client  applications  such  as  Web 
browsers by specifying the URLs of the sites that wish to access 
or  by  following  URLs  provided  by  services  and  Web  sites. 
Hyperlinks, resolved by the DNS referencing system, are the key 
to the information access and flow. 
This  explicit  information  exchange  between  users  and  content 
providers  is  dwarfed  by  the  scale  of  data  gathering  at  various 
levels of the infrastructure, communication protocols, and specific 
service access on the Web that are not visible to the individuals. 
Indeed, every process and every interaction with the Web leaves a 
digital  footprint  that  can  be  persisted  by  the  providers  of  the 
services. That ranges from the low level network data captured by 
the intermediaries that facilitate Web traffic in general, such as 
DNS services and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to the usage 
data collected by the Web servers that host and provide content. 
Generally,  usage  data  of  computing  systems  can  help  with 
resolving  engineering  issues  and  improving  usability  of  the 
services. However, the Web has evolved to include data collection 
with  a  much  broader  scope  and  purpose.  Digital  footprints 
associated with specific services, and information inferred from 
such data, have become the common source of economic value within the Web ecosystem. Methods, such as third party tracking 
via  cookies,  have  been  devised  to  gather  information  about 
individuals  browsing  habits  and  interests  across  Web  sites. 
Browser  add-ons  such  as  search  toolbars  continuously  send 
information  about  the  user’s  activities  online.  In  essence,  the 
information is gathered in exchange for the service. 
More importantly, the value of user generated data is now driving 
the design of new types of services that, essentially, provide a 
digital  real  estate  within  which  the  interaction  of  individuals 
occur. In such cases both the user generated content and the usage 
information  are  accessible  to  the  service  providers.  In  fact,  in 
many  instances,  the  consent  forms  that  the  users  agree  to 
explicitly claim the ownership and rights to the data use by the 
service providers. 
While we agree that there is some ambiguity as to the rights of the 
consumers, it is safe to assume that the usage and the ownership 
of  the  data  disclosed  through  the  Web  infrastructure  is  in  the 
hands  of  those  who  own  it.  Privatization  of  the  Internet 
infrastructure  in  1990s  [22]  has  played  a  role  in  the  rapid 
development of the Web economy that we have now. 
One of the main purposes of this paper is to dispel any illusion of 
the  Web  as  simply  a  ‘free  for  all’  information  medium.  As 
researchers we have a mandate to dive deeper into the phenomena 
of the Web and look at it from the engineering, economic, and 
social perspective. 
Our  studies  confirmed  that  the  complexity  of  the  Web 
technologies and the lack of transparency in the design of services 
and client applications have left consumers in the dark about the 
collection and use of their digital footprints.  
Not surprisingly, we often hear reports that people do not care 
about privacy [2, 5], putting forward the argument that if they did 
care  they  would  use  ad blockers and  cookie blockers  and  stop 
posting personal details on social networking sites. Our case study 
that presents how people’s responses change when they see what 
tracking looks like led us to think that most of us operate from the 
perspective  “if  we  don’t  see  it,  it’s  not  happening”.  This  is 
consistent with our understanding of human psychology in which 
salience and availability play a significant part [6].  There was a 
time when the notion of invisible “germs” was inconceivable and 
it was hard to motivate people to wash their hands, even among 
the medical staff. People did not perceive a correlation between 
illness  and  lack  of  hygiene.  It’s  still  unclear  if  unseen  Web 
interactions have similar effects. Our study offers the  basis for 
situating  the  issues  of  privacy  preferences  within  a  research 
agenda that explores how our requirements and expectations about 
Web interactions changes as we develop mechanisms that reveal 
the unseen surveillance activities.  
Furthermore, our empirical analysis of online services and cookie 
based tracking reveal the scope, the scale and the pervasiveness of 
such practices. Finally, we confirm that the Web of information 
has  been  transformed  into  the  Web  of  data  trading  that  leaves 
consumers without say and without choice except to opt out from 
the  Web  usage  altogether.  Thus,  we  are  strongly  motivated  to  
extend the debate beyond the narrow technological field of the 
Web to the societal values, preferences, and specific measures that 
can be taken to enforce them if the Web is to become the essential 
underpinning of our societies and our digital future. 
3.  BACKGROUND 
In  this  section  we  present  a  brief  overview  of  tracking 
technologies  that  are  used  in  various  online  scenarios.  Most 
straightforwardly,  the  users’  activities  and  data  are  logged  and 
processed  by  entities  that  provide  services  to  the  users. 
Information about the user interests and habits is typically used to 
personalize  the  service  or  facilitate  marketing  campaigns  and 
deliver targeted advertising. In general, one cannot assume that 
the use and resale of user profiles is restricted to the specific usage 
scenario.  In  addition,  there  has  been  little  awareness  and 
understanding of online tracking practices facilitated by cookies 
[8, 20]. This lack of awareness is partially due to the obscurity of 
the standard Web browser interface that neither informs us about 
cookies  installed  on  our  computer  nor  makes  explicit  the 
mechanism  by  which  they  enable  the  trackers  to  follow  our 
interactions from one Web site to another [14, 20].  
3.1  Third Party Cookies 
Browser cookies are text files of small size that are installed on 
the user’s computer at the time the browser is connecting with a 
Web site. They can be thought of as badges that the sites can use 
to label an individual. Cookies were originally intended to deal 
with  the  stateless  nature  of  the  Web  [9]  and  enable  a  better 
experience for users as they move between the pages on a website. 
Such cookies are normally referred to as first party cookies since 
they are created by the Web site that the user is visiting. However, 
the use of cookies has evolved. By the same mechanism, other 
domains that are referred to by the first party website, such as 
advertisers or analytics providers, can install cookies on the user’s 
computer. Such cookies area referred to as third party cookies.  
Installing third party cookies on a site has a dual effect. First the 
third party can monitor repeat visits to the first party website by 
the  same  user.  Second,  the  third  party  may  reach  the  same 
agreement with other sites, thus creating the basis for tracking the 
user  across  multiple participating  sites.  By  enlisting  companies 
across  market  sectors  the  third  party  can  track  individuals  in 
different contexts, from online shopping to gaming, entertainment, 
or search for health and financial advice. Furthermore, it can pass 
on this information to other partners who may be interested in 
specific types of tracking and marketing practices.  
Figure 1 shows our analysis of user logs, based on a week-long 
logging of Web sites and tracking domains.  As the user visits, for 
example,  forbes.com,  the  user  is  immediately  enlisted  in  the 
network of participating Web sites and trackers.  The collection of 
information and placement of targeted ads is enabled by a tracker 
domain such as doubleclick.com.  
3.2  Blocking Tracking Cookies 
Various  Web  browsers  provide  different  levels  of  control  over 
cookie exposure. Almost all standard browsers offer basic features 
to block cookies of certain types or cookies from specific site. 
Thus,  individuals  who  are  aware  of  the  tracking  practices  can 
assert  a  level  of  control  over  their  exposure  to  tracking. 
Furthermore,  by  using  specialized  add-ons  designed  to  support 
management  of  Browser  cookies,  the  users  can  gain  access  to 
more  information  about  the  tracking  domains.  Such  is  the 
Ghostery add-on (www.ghostery.com) available for the Internet 
Explorer, Firefox, Safari, Opera, and Google Chrome browsers.  
3.3  Other Tracking Practices 
Cookies are only one kind of tracking. We have focused on these 
because,  while  often  unobserved  by  users,  they  are  easily 
detected. There are other kinds of tracking that leave little or no trace,  suggesting  that  our  case  studies  will  already  be  only 
partially indicative of how wide-spread and deep tracking may be.  
Tracking techniques can be split into two categories: stateful, and 
stateless  [12].    Stateful  mechanisms  rely  on  storing  some 
information  on  the  users’  computer  and  so  HTTP  cookies  fall 
within  this  category.    Other  stateful  mechanisms  include  Flash 
“LSOs”  (which  operate  similar  to  cookies),  HTML5’s  “local 
storage” API or more subtle techniques that make use of browser 
caching mechanisms.   
Stateless mechanisms, by contrast, do not rely upon any kind of 
stored state.  Instead, they rely on identifying a unique (or at least 
very uncommon) combination of properties related to a particular 
device.  This could include, for instance, the list of installed fonts, 
the “clock skew” of the device (the number of milliseconds that 
the device’s clock deviates from the true time), the list of installed 
plugins or  the  user-agent  string  that  identifies  the  browser  and 
operating system version.  Combined, these properties can provide 
enough  entropy  to  uniquely  identify  a  particular  device  with 
enough stability to do so multiple times. 
3.4  Online Advertising 
Web  sites  who  subscribe  to  an  ad  exchange  service  embedded 
code  (e.g.,  Javascript)  on  their  pages  that  connects  to  the  ad 
 
 
(a)  Forbes.com serves as a host for tracking and site analytics domains, including doubleclick.com, googleanalytics.com, and 
scorecardresearch.com. 
   
(b)  Network of web sites and third party domains in the 
doubclick.com tracking network  
(c)  googleanalytics.com domain connects only to the web 
sites. It does not involve other third parties. 
Figure 1. Network of Web sites (black) and tracking companies (red and purple) that are involved in installing cookies on the 
user computer. Red colored third party domains involve their partner domains. Graphs include nodes with eigenvector 
centrality of 0.0032 and above. 
 networks and loads adverts into the Web page at the time a page is 
rendered by the browser. In that process, ad networks may store or 
retrieve  cookies  containing  a  persistent  user  identifier.  Such 
cookies are referred to as third party cookies, in contrast to the 
first party cookies that are delivered by the Web site itself. The 
latter  are  commonly  used  to  support  log-in  and  multi-page 
browsing on the site. As the user visits other sites associated with 
the same ad network, this third party cookie is used by the ad 
network to identify the user pseudonymously. In this way the ad 
network obtains, processes, and accumulates data about the user’s 
online activity in real time. 
Figure 1 illustrates the tracking mechanism: shows Web sites a 
user  visited  over  10  days  (circular  nodes)  and  the  third  party 
domains  that  were  referred  to  during  site  visits  (red  diamond 
nodes). In the user’s visit to everydayhealth.com, we observe that 
the  visited  page  referred  to  a  number  of  third  parties  which 
delivered adverts and installed cookies on the user’s computer. 
Among  them  is  the  tracking  domain  doubleclick.net  which  is 
associated with other Web sites that the user visited (see Figure 
2b). Every time the user  visits such a site, the user’s action is 
known to doubleclick.net. That information becomes the basis for 
behavioral  targeting  as  it  captures  user’s  activities  across  Web 
sites. 
4.  RELATED RESEARCH 
4.1  Behavioral Tracking and Responses 
Online  Behavioral  Advertising  (OBA)  aims  at  inferring  users’ 
intent,  preferences,  habits,  and  interests  from  their  online 
activities  and  selecting  personal  ads  to  present  to  the  user.  In 
many instances, the OBA providers, such as audiencescience.com 
and  audiencetargetting.com  offer  retargeting  of  ads  [10].  Ad 
retargeting involves placing an ad related to the Web site on the 
pages of subsequently visited sites and extending the exposure to 
the ad over time. 
Privacy  concerns  related  to  the  user  tracking  led  to  OBA 
approaches that reduce the scope of user information that is shared 
during ad targeting. Among such methods is user modeling on the 
client side, i.e., within the browser. 
The  system  Adnostic  by  Toubiana  et  al.  [25]  uses  a  browser 
extension that incorporates behavioral targeting algorithm based 
on a local database of browsing history, not shared with external 
parties.  Similar attempts towards privacy protecting techniques 
have been explored by Langheririch et al. [11] and Tomlin [24].  
In 2011, Riderer et al. [18] proposed an alternative mechanism of 
transitional  privacy,  allowing  the  user  to  decide  what  personal 
information  is  released  and  put  on  sale  while  receiving 
compensation for it. 
4.2  Analysis of Tracking Practices 
Krishnamurthy and Wills [8] examine technical aspects of data 
aggregation  by  the  third  parties  and,  through  longitudinal 
observations  of  the  techniques  and  entities  involved  in  the 
tracking practices,  show that the market is consolidating towards 
strong dominance by a few companies.  
Furthermore, Roesner et al. [20] differentiate among 5 third-party 
tracking practices based on the mechanism they use to manipulate 
the browser state. They designate them as: (1) analytics, for within 
site monitoring using a third party (e.g., Google Analytics), (2) 
vanilla,  for  cross  site  monitoring  (e.g.,  DoubleClick),  where  a 
third party stores and aggregates user data, (3) forced tracking, for 
using pop-ups or similar mechanisms to force the users to visit the 
tracker’s  site,  (4)  referred,  for  negotiating  with  a  service  or  a 
cross-site  tracker  to  provide  the  unique  user  identifier,  and  (5) 
personal, for embedding a tracker (e.g., Facebook ‘Likes’ widget) 
that the user visits directly. They select 1,000 Web sites from the 
Alexa service (www.alexa.com) to observe the tracking practices 
and show that on most of the observed sites the users are tracked 
by  multiple  parties  which  combine  different  tracking  practices. 
The coverage of the Web sites by the trackers varies with few of 
them playing a dominant role with large coverage.  
Krishnamurthy  and  Wills’s  2009  longitudinal  study  of  Web 
tracking practices on the Web [8] shows the historical evolution of 
the major tracking entities. More recent work by Roesner, Kohno, 
and Wetherall 2012 [20] provides more detailed differentiation of 
tracking  mechanism  and  statistical  analysis  of  the  tracking 
domains. They used Alexa rankings of sites from September 19, 
2011 and observed tracking practice associated with 2500 pages 
from the top 500 international Web sites.  The average number of 
trackers on 1655 pages, from 457 domains that embed at least one 
tracker,  is  over  4.5.  Of  these,  1469  pages  include  at  least  one 
cross-site tracker.  Overall  they  identified  a  total  of  524 unique 
tracker  companies  and  estimated  that  several  trackers can  each 
capture more than 20% of a user’s browsing behavior.  
4.3  URL sharing in Social Media 
One of our case study is particularly concerned with the use of 
social media, specifically Twitter, to propagate Web content by 
sharing URLs in tweets. Twitter users share tens of millions of 
Web links every day [17] and this trend is expected to increase 
over  time.  Market  research  has  already  shown  that  social 
networking sites are becoming a major driver of traffic to many 
Web  sites  [1].  Schonfeld  [21]  reported  that  for  some  sites, 
Facebook and Twitter drive, respectively, 44% and 29% of the 
traffic.  Rodrigues at  al.  [19]  found  that,  on  average,  a  URL  is 
spread by 3 users and reaches 843 users. 
Considering the URL propagation patterns, Rodrigues et al. [19] 
differentiate among three types of participants: the initiators, the 
spreaders,  and  the  receivers.  The  propagation  ends  with  the 
receivers. Data analysis showed that nearly 90% of all URLs were 
propagated  only  by  initiators  without  involving  any  spreaders, 
which  indicates  the  importance  of  the  initiators  in  the  content 
discovery. Thus, it is not surprising that the Twitter cascades tend 
to be much wider than they are deep. However, those URLs that 
involved spreaders would gain 3.5 times larger audience showing 
that  multi-hop  propagation  of  URLs  significantly  increases  the 
reach of the Web content.  
Wu et al. [27] considered 5B tweets generated over a 223 day 
period in 2010. Among them were 260 million tweets with bit.ly 
URLs.    Their  analysis  showed  that  roughly  50%  of  URLs  in 
Twitter are generated by only 20,000 elite users (0.05% of the 
user  population).  Among  them  the  media  produces  the  most 
information while the celebrities are most followed. Furthermore, 
different  types  of  content  exhibit  very  different  lifespans  with 
media-originated  URLs  being  predominant  among  short-lived 
URLs  while  those  originated  by  bloggers  are  prevalent  among 
long-lived URLs. In fact, the longest-lived URLs are related to 
media  content  such  as  videos  and  music  that  seems  to  be 
repeatedly  rediscovered  by  the  Twitter  users  and  thus  persist 
within Twitter.  
Our study complements this research by focusing on the invisible 
network of trackers that the users of social media are exposed to 
while  visiting  the  shared  URLs.  We  explore  how  much  of  the 
personal and social information can be revealed to the trackers 
just from the visits to the URL domains.     
(a)  Network visualization of third parties (red and purple nodes) 
referred to by the Web sites (green nodes). A directed edge 
indicates a referal from a domain to another.    
 
(b)  Information about third parties in the tabular form. Pink−TP 
that  uses  cookies;  Yellow−TP  that  does  not  use  cookies; 
Blue/White indicates no tracking.   
Figure 2. Aggregate information about third party (TP) 
involvement with visited first party (FP) domains during user 
browsing based on user log collected over a period of 7 days. 
 
5.  CASE STUDIES 
We have conducted three studies around the surveillance Web that 
provide  empirical  evidence  of  its  scale  and  reach  as  well  as 
qualitative insight into the beliefs and expectations of Web users 
in relation to the surveillance of their own Web browsing activity. 
5.1  Browsing and Cookie Invisibility 
As part of a study evaluating real-time in-browser visualization of 
surveillance  activity,  we  obtained  browsing  logs  for  14  users.  
These logs were used to create visualizations that were shown to 
participants during semi-structured interviews in order to capture 
their reactions to the revelation of the surveillance networks. 
Example visualisations are shown in Figure 2.  Each participant 
was shown the two visualisations and was provided with a verbal 
explanation  of  each.    We  first  checked  the  participants’ 
understanding by asking them questions which required them to 
read information from each visualisation. We then inquired about  
their reaction to the presented information. 
Reactions  to  the  visualisations  were  fairly  uniform  across 
participants.  Participants indicated that the extent of the tracking 
was a revelation to them; for instance: “I never realised … how 
many websites were watching [the] website that you're on” and “I 
didn't know that that many websites could all see what you were 
doing.”   
This is an interesting result, as the same information was available 
to the participants via browser add-ons during the. It indicates that 
participants more easily appreciate the scale of TPT when it is 
presented in aggregate, outside the browsing context, than when 
shown for a single site during the browsing task.  This confirms 
our first hypothesis that, despite the surveillance infrastructure of 
the Web being detectable by technical means it is largely invisible 
from a user’s point of view.   
Participants’  responses  reflect  the  general  anonymity  of  parties 
involved in TPT: “I have no idea who they are”, “I never heard of 
this company, Rubicon” and “I probably don’t know any of them.  
I would want to know what the nature of their business is.” 
5.2  Exposure to Trackers through Search 
As Michael Zimmer argued in his 2006 paper [31], “The Panoptic 
Gaze  of  Web  Search  Engines,”  search  engines  are  the  portal 
through  which  much  of  the  Web  is  accessed.    They  have 
unrivalled  access  to  the  lists  of  keywords  that  describe  what 
individuals and groups are interested in, and which betray their 
thoughts.  However, by acting as a portal to content on the web 
they  also  act  as  a  portal  to  the  surveillance  infrastructure  that 
permeates  it.    The  goal  of  this  second  study  was  to  better 
understand how search engines expose Web users to surveillance 
[4].  
We  obtained  search  results  for  662  categorised  search  queries, 
from two search engines (Google and Bing), across 3 English-
language markets (United States, United Kingdom, South Africa 
and India).  Using the browser automation framework Selenium 
and the Firefox web browser, we crawled each set of 10 search 
results.  Using a custom browser add-on we recorded the HTTP 
Referer headers sent by the browser to create a map of the third 
parties associated with each visited website. 
Based  on  their  network  properties  and  appearance  in  search 
results, we categorised the websites that were contacted by the 
web browser into four groups (Figure 3). 
1.  Web sites: Web domains whose pages appear among search 
results and are not referred to by other sites. They are thought 
of as the first party only domains.    
2.  Third party only: Web domains that are referred to by Web 
sites  or  other  third party  domains and never  appear  among 
search  results  nor  refer  to  other  domains.  Such  are,  for 
example,  googleanalytics.com  or  ad  services  that  place  ads 
directly on the Web pages. 
3.  Dual role: Web domains that appear as both first party and 
third party domains. Example is facebook.com which appears 
among search results and is referred to by sites that include 
the Facebook “Likes” widgets.  
4.  Ad Exchange Service: Web domains that appear only as third 
parties, i.e., do not appear in search results, and refer to other 
third party domains. They are intermediary third parties that 
provide a bridge between  Web  sites and other third parties 
involved in ad bidding. 
 Our  analysis  of  the  search  results  in  different  search  markets 
revealed  a  consistently  high  extent  of  third  party  tracking. 
Similarly to previous studies [8], we identified a small number 
agencies that dominate the user tracking and advertising markets. 
However, in contrast to Roesner et al. [20] who focus on popular 
Web sites and tracking classification based on the mechanisms for 
implementing cookies, we focused on user exposure to tracking in 
a  real  usage  scenario  and  broadened  the  scope  of  the  tracking 
analysis to the properties of the referrer network itself.  
By considering directional links of the referral networks we can 
easily observe the role of the domains as illustrated in Fig. 7. An 
in-link to a node is a referral that provides an opportunity for that 
entity to surveil the user. 
In order to estimate the rate at which users are exposed to third 
parties,  we  estimate  the  probability  P(T)  that  a  search  result    
exposes the user to a third-party T by calculating the proportion of 
search results that refer to T.  We rank third parties based on P(T) 
and, for the top 10, determine the likelihood that the user will 
encounter  each  of  these  parties  after  accessing  a  number  of 
retrieved search results. We make two simplifying assumptions. 
First, we assume that any Web page from a given Web site is 
exposing the user to the same set of trackers. Second, we expect 
that the user’s choice to visit a search result is independent from 
the previously seen pages.  Based on this model we observe the 
probabilities that a user would have encountered all top ten third 
parties.  We  find  that  after  visiting  just  30  search  results,  the 
probability of getting cookies from all top 10 third party domains 
is  99.5%.  Figure  4  shows the  probabilities of  encountering  the 
trackers when using Bing and Google search engines in the US 
Market.  
5.3  Exposure to Trackers through Social 
Media 
On  today’s  Web,  the  role  of  content  discovery  is  increasingly 
filled by social media and no longer confined primarily to search 
engines.    Although  search  still  fulfils  an  important  role  for 
purposive information retrieval, social media provides a means for 
individuals  to  share  content  through  social  networks  that  form 
around  real-world  ties or  as a  result  of  shared  interests online.  
Social media is, therefore, a key mechanism through which Web 
users  are  brought  to  online  content  and  hence  how  they  are 
exposed to the surveillance infrastructure.  This additional means 
of  content  discovery  potentially  reveals  different  information 
about the user; inferences can now be drawn about which topics a 
user has a general interest in, which communities they are part of 
and who they are influenced by.   
To investigate the surveillance that users are exposed to through 
social media we conducted a third study, similar to the study that 
was conducted on search results.  The aim was to obtain a referrer 
network of the first and third parties involved in URLs shared on 
the social networking service twitter, and to characterise the way 
in which users are exposed to surveillance when engaging with 
the shared URLs. 
A dataset of 5.4 million tweets was collected via the twitter API 
over a period of seven days in January 2013.  The stream was 
filtered to the 54 most popular hashtags in ten topics, obtained 
from  hashtags.org  on  05/01/2013:  U.S.  Politics, 
TV/Entertainment,  Music,  General,  Business,  Tech,  Education, 
Environment,  Social  Change  and  Astrology.    Our  aim  was  to 
collect tweets with URLs, focusing on specific topics have been 
the subject of previous research [26]. 
We  extracted  and  expanded  the  URLs  from  all  the  collected 
tweets that received at least one retweet. Repeated tweets were 
discarded  and  only  the  original  ones  were  kept  in  the  dataset. 
After  applying  these  filters  we  arrive  at  a  dataset  of  499,916 
tweets. 
 
Figure 3.  In-degree vs. out-degree of the nodes of the global 
network. The size of the nodes is mapped to the total degree. 
 
(a)  Probability of encountering tracking domains while browsing 
results of Google in the US Search market 
 
(b)  Probability of encountering tracking domains while browsing 
the results Bing in the US market 
Figure 4. When browsing search results , the user is  exposed 
to tracking domains. We calculate the probability that the 
user encounters top tracking domains while visiting a random 
set of search result pages.  
 
Figure 5. The number of twitter streams in which at least 
one  third  party  can  observe  a  given  percentage  of  the 
tweeted URLs. 
Again, we used the Firefox web browser and Selenium browser 
automation framework to visit each of the URLs in the dataset and 
recorded  the  HTTP  Referer  headers  to  build  up  a  network  of 
domains, indicating which first party domain referred to which 
third parties. The percentage of URLs that were observable by 
each, are shown in Table 1. Also in Table 1 are the top third party 
domains by user coverage.  That is to say, the third party domains 
that were able to observe at least one URL that was tweeted by a 
given user.  For instance, 73.7% of users tweeted at least one URL 
that  was  observable  by  google -analytics.com,  and  google-
analytics.com was able to observe 41.5% of the total URLs that 
were tweeted. 
Subsequently, we  were able to analyse  what percentage of t he 
URLs in each users’ tweets were observable by each third party.  
Overall results from this analysis are indicated in Figure 5, which 
shows the number of twitter streams in which the most common 
tracker  could  observe  the  given  percentage  of  URLs.    For 
instance,  if  100%  of  the  tweeted  URLs  were  observable  by  a 
single tracker, that twitter stream is classified as 100%.  If 49% of 
the tweeted URLs were observable to one third party, and 65% 
visible to another then that user’s Twitter stream is classified as 
60-69%. 
We repeated this analysis twice—once including all Twitter users 
with 4 or more tweets in the dataset and once including only those 
with 10 or more tweets in the dataset. The results show that 100% 
of the URLs tweeted by many users were observable to the same 
third party and thus any follower who visited any URLs tweeted 
by those users was guaranteed to be surveilled by that third party. 
5.4  Analysis: Surveillance Hidden in Plain 
Sight 
The  results  from  these  three  studies  reveal  three  important 
properties of the web’s surveillance architecture that are relevant 
to this paper: 
1.  The  infrastructure  is  largely  invisible  to  web  users,  despite 
being relatively easy to detect by technical means.  Users are 
surprised when shown how many domains are able to observe 
their web browsing. 
2.  Surveillance is very widespread, to the point of being almost 
unavoidable.    We  observe  that  the  probability  of  being 
observable at least once by all top ten of the most common 
third parties is 99.5% after visiting just 30 URLs. 
3.  Surveillance is highly centralized.  Despite the huge number 
of  third  party  domains  that  were  uncovered  during  the 
crawling,  a  handful  of  domains  dominate  the  network.  
Doubleclick.com alone was able to observe visits to 15% of 
all  the  URLs  obtained  from  twitter,  with  64%  of  all  users 
tweeting at least one URL that is observable by Doubleclick. 
We  caution  that  the  behaviour  of  many  of  the  third  parties  is 
unknown.  While companies such as Doubleclick are relatively 
open about the purpose of their surveillance, others are not.  We 
used the presence of cookies on a domain to determine whether a 
domain had the potential to track a user across multiple requests 
but this does not take into account the other stateful or stateless 
tracking mechanisms that exist.  
Whereas a Web user can be reasonably confident in understanding 
which organisations are providing the online tools that they use, 
we  have  seen  that  Web  users  are  not  aware  of  the  scale  of 
surveillance that is possible as they browse the Web and that they 
have not even heard of many of the organisations that are party to 
portions  of  their  web  browsing  history.    Furthermore,  the 
surveillance  Web  directly  supplements  the  dataveillance  that  is 
possible  through  cloud  applications  like  email  or  productivity 
tools.    Not  only  do  companies  like  Google have  access to  the 
information  contained  within  a  person’s  emails,  calendar, 
documents  and  search  history,  they  have  access  to  information 
about their visits to numerous Web sites that rely on services such 
as  Google  Analytics  or  advertising  via  Doubleclick  (a  Google 
subsidiary).  Organisations such as Facebook and Twitter can use 
dataveillance performed via “social widgets” that are embedded 
on  third  party  websites  to  supplement  the  information  about  a 
user’s social network with data about the websites that they have 
visited 
6.  DISCUSSION: ALTERNATIVE WEBS 
The findings from the presented three case demonstrate that the 
surveillance Web, this Grey Web, is the Web. We propose the 
term “grey” for all its connotations of ambiguous status between 
black and white markets, greys of shades of grey in an argument, 
and also grey as hidden, occluded, moving in shadows. As we 
note, we trace only some aspects of some tracking. 
 
Table 1.   Third party domains ranked by % of re-tweeted 
URLs that refer to the specific domain and by % of users 










google-analytics.com 41.5%  google-analytics.com  73.7% 
facebook.com  22.2%  doubleclick.net  64.1% 
google.com  21.3%  google.com  58.8% 
twitter.com  20.7%  gstatic.com  57.4% 
gstatic.com  19.2%  googlesyndication.com 57.0% 
chartbeat.net  18.8%  googleadservices.com  52.9% 
chartbeat.com  18.8%  facebook.com  49.6% 
youtube.com  15.6%  googleusercontent.com 48.6% 
doubleclick.net  15.3%  youtube.com  45.4% 
facebook.net  14.3%  youtube-nocookie.com  39.4% Given  Clarke’s  prescription  for  dataveillance,  this  result  –  the 
evolution of the web into this grey web - seems to be expected, 
i.e., inevitable within any networked data system. In the absence 
of  the  implicit  and  explicit  controls  that  he  describes,  ranging 
from audit trails to privacy laws, no matter how the Web is re-
engineered  to  hold  off  the  deliberate  breaking  of  our 
cryptographic codes as done by NSA, this “legal” surveillance, 
under the guise of “free services” will simply be maintained or 
recreated—as they are now the “norm”, expected and the de facto. 
Moreover, there is no alternative channel. Citizens cannot readily 
opt  out  of  this  commercial  panopticon  when  increasingly  all 
information from government services to utilities to purchasing of 
goods  takes  place  over  that  surveilled  channel,  by  both 
governments and industries.    
Clarke differentiates between “mass dataveillance” and “personal 
dataveillance”.    Mass  dataveillance  is  “the  systematic  use  of 
personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the 
actions  or  communications  of  groups  of  people”.  Similarly, 
personal  dataveillance  is  “the  systematic  use  of  personal  data 
systems  in  the  investigation  or  monitoring  of  the  actions  or 
communications of an identified person”.   
In the Web of 2014 we propose that we are presented with an 
infrastructure  for  “mass  personal  dataveillance”,  that  is,  the 
systematic use of personal data systems to monitor the actions of 
many identified people.  The scope of what is available via the 
combination  of  the  surveillance  Web  and  its  enabling 
dataveillance  apparatus  (such  as  online  services)  is  akin  to 
personal  dataveillance,  with  the  purpose  to  glean  information 
about a specific individual for the purpose of commercial gain, for 
instance,  targeted  advertising.    The  dataveillance  is,  though, 
conducted on the same scale as mass surveillance.  We are all 
personally surveilled. 
Given the privileged access that governments have to the private 
dataveillance  infrastructure  that  has  been  built  by  the  likes  of 
Google,  Microsoft  or  Facebook  [15],  if  we  wish  to  make 
government  surveillance  more  difficult  through  engineering 
measures, we need to tackle this private infrastructure, too.  
We  note  there  are  a  variety  of  initiatives  that  technologically 
describe  alternatives  to  clouds  of  data  shared  by  large  hosts, 
probed  by  large  services  where  each  transaction  is  known. 
Webbox [7], the Locker Project [13], Data.fm [16] are a few of 
the  examples  that  propose  peer-to-peer,  controlled  sharing 
networks for exchange of information among groups. These are 
engineering oriented solutions to a massive, global way of being. 
They may implicitly rely on a sense of honouring personal privacy 
and data control as a fundamental component, but, as engineering 
solutions they, again, a priori do not and perhaps on their own 
cannot embody the explicit/implicit controls that Clarke identifies 
must  precede  engineering  to  ensure  that  any  networked  data 
solution respects auditability and ownership.  
Our goal in this presentation has been to offer in quantified terms 
clear  evidence  that  the  Web  has  moved  from  a  more  neutral 
document/data  Web  of  pre  third-party  cookies,  now  being  the 
tracking, surveilling Web at industrial scale.    
How  to  move  forward  from  this  point  we  suggest  is  a  grand 
challenge for Web Science. We may need to think boldly about 
blank slates and starting fresh; of moving out of the monoculture 
of the surveillance Web into a multicosm of multiple Webs. At 
this point, the appropriate place for Web re-imagining is in the 
realm of research rather than industry or government, as it has 
been  evidenced  by  the  degree  to  which  trying  to  backfill  the 
current Web with new policy is failing. For instance, in Europe, 
there  is  the  1995  Data  Protection  Directive  and  the  ePrivacy 
Directive  [29],  the  latter  specifically  targeting  stateful  tracking 
mechanisms by requiring user consent. We see this manifest in the 
UK as a banner that shows up on Web sites simply stating that a 
page uses cookies. One can either use the page or not—a false 
option surely if one must access the service.  
More recently, a 2014 deadline for the proposed Data Protection 
Regulations was dropped by the European Council, in favour of 
less urgent “timely adoption” at the request of the UK, to provide 
more time for the government to ‘consider the implications of the 
regulations for businesses’. Given the blurred distinction between 
state and private dataveillance, it is not clear why the surveillance 
Web is not covered by legislation that governs surveillance, such 
as the UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). That 
said,  exercising  existing  regulations  has  proven  to  be  difficult, 
with American companies questioning whether European courts 
have jurisdiction to try cases brought under European laws [30].  
While  current  businesses  and  policy  makers  are  enmeshed  in 
current  technologies  and  interests  of  the  surveillance  Web,  we 
need Web Scientists to reimagine technology, law, economics and 
social policy re-delivering a new variant, pre “betrayal.”   
Fundamentally, the observed phenomena is, in  many  ways, the 
repeat of history. In any technological revolution we, as citizens 
have had very little say in the technologies that are largely thrust 
upon  us,  from  agriculture  to  the  industrial  revolution  to  the 
railway with its robber barons, and oil with it nation state interest. 
The surveillance Web has evolved as the next channel for a global 
economy and its interests. In each epoch there have been those to 
argue that the new technology can also bring new benefits to the 
dispossessed. Certainly, but at what cost? It will be interesting to 
see  whether  the  interdisciplinary  community  of  scholars  in  the 
new  field  of  Web  Science  might  have  any  greater  effect  in 
mitigating the current control of the Web by the same old few 
major players we seem to find in any utility/industry and re-create 
a new status quo.   
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In  this  paper  we  have  contributed  methods  and  results  for 
quantifying and presenting the prevalence of user tracking on the 
Web. We used this evidence to support our claim that the Web has 
been  transformed  from  the  information  media  into  a  complex 
economic  ecosystem  based  on  tracking  and  surveillance  of  the 
user’s  behavior.  We  recognize  that  we  are  able  to  graph  and 
represent the tracking that remains traceable trough observing the 
HTTP traffic and site referral. Thus, the provided view is far from 
exhaustive of the types of data gathering, analysis, and trading on 
the Web.  
We have suggested that the prevalence of this non-governmental, 
largely commercial and unregulated tracking, is an evolution in 
the  Web  that  has  moved  from  its  early  days  as  a  Web  of 
hyperlinked documents and the means for connecting people, to 
the elaborate Clarke’s dataveillence network. We have suggested 
that in the absence of the implicit and explicit controls promoted 
by  Clarke,  this  transition  of  the  Web  into  mass  personal 
dataveillence was inevitable.    
Our  future  work  will  focus  on  promoting  the  framing  of  the 
privacy  issues  as  the  Web  transformation  into  the  surveillance 
Web.  We  present  the  surveillance  Web  to  the  Web  Science 
community to embrace it as a grand challenge and inspiration for 
devising the Web that we, citizens, want for ourselves.  8.  REFERENCES 
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